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Note:

Center Discuss ion Papers are prelimin ary materia ls circulat ed to
stimula te discussi on and critica l comment. Referen ces in pub
lication s to Discuss ion Papers should be cleared with the author
to protect the tentativ e characte r of these papers.

*As will become apparen t to the reader, I rely heavily on data

kindly provided by the Harvard Hultina tional Enterpr ise Project ,under
the directio n of Raymond Vernon. Carlos Diaz-Al ejandro and Louis T. Wells,
Jr. made helpful comments on earlier drafts. Elizabe th Brugess was an
extreme ly diligen t research assistan t on this project . Nationa l Science
Foundat ion grant GS-33741x provided financia l support . I am·sole ly
respons ible for any opinion s or errors.
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profit s
"Surpl us capita l. ••will be used for the purpos e of increa sing •••
by expor ting capita l abroad to the backward count ries.

In these backward

of
count ries profit s are usuall y high, for capita l is scarce , the price
land is relati vely low, wages are low, raw mater ials are cheap ."

v. I. Lenin , Imper ialism , the Highe st State of Capita lism (New York:
Intern ationa l Publis hers), p. 63.

I

The notion that busine ssmen invest inorde r to increa se profit s

count ries.
still influe nces many econom ists analyz ing invest ment in foreig n
of
MacDo ugall, for examp le, in 1960 analyz ed the impact on Austr alia
tors.
foreig n invest ment from Britai n by assumi ng that " ••• Britis h inves
n
if left to their own device s, equate the return s on home and foregi
invest ments ."

1

Kindle berger s in the late 1960 's, consid ered " ••• the

they
terrib le possi bility ••• that busine ssmen actual ly do as they say
long•
do and invest where marke ts are, withou t suffic iently consid ering
112
run profit s margin s.

In gener al, howev er, Kindle berger seems to feel

cal
invest ment decisi ons are ". c .presu mably made on the basis of fine
113 Aharo ni, on the other
culati ons of ccsts .?.nci prosp ective profit s.
hand, conclu ded

11

•• e

J.nves tors first wanted to avoid loss (both of

1
G.D. A, MacDcugall~ "The Benef its and Costs of Privat e Invest -gs in
ment from Abrot:d ! A Theor etical Appro ach," reprin ted in Readin
n
Intern ationa l Economics, e1. Richar d E. Caves and Harry G. Johnso
(Homewood, Illino is~ Pichar d D,. Irwin, 1968), p. 174.
2

Charle s P. Kindle berger , American Busine ss Abroad (New Haven:
Yale Unive rcity Press paperb ack) 1969), p. 9,
3

Ib?.:~•, p, 17

-

2 -

capital and management time) ac,d uncerta inty.

Thetefor e~ they were not

111
attracte d by au inducem ent that is a function of profits.

If firms were maximiz ing profits 1 then we would expect the

observed profit late to be greater on foreign investm ents for two reasons .
First, if firms £ace the same Iir.ear homogeneous prcducti on function
at home and ove:rseas ari.d if the capital- labor ratio is hieher in the

U.S., then equating the margina l product ivity of capital in the two
markets implies a lcwer average rate of return in the U,S.

S~cond, it

is frequen tly asserted that the. risks on foreign investm ent exceed the

risks on domestic investm ent, and so it is argued foreign profit rates
should exceed domestic profit rates.
Reported average profits on overseas investm ent by U.S. manufac 
turing firms are abou~ the same or perhaps even slightly less than on
domestic investm ent.

Bhile the return on foreign manufac turing invest

ments slightly exceeded tI-:at

:i:1

domestic i.nvestm ents in several recent

years (1959, J.960, 1961, 1%2, 1963~ and 1969), over the decade the
yield on domes·dc manufac turing investm ents averaged J_2.4 percent as
compared to 11.S percent on d~rect foreign manufac t~ring investm ents.

2

Those who believe f:'.nns are maximiz ing profits explain these data in
one of th::·ee ways:

( 1) f i '.'.'ms maximize expected long-run profits , and

1

Aharoni , The Foreign InYestm ent Decision Process , p. 235. See
also Robert Hellawe ll, "Unit.e.d -States Income Taxation and Less Develope d
Countri es: A Critic.s. l Apprais al," Columbia Law Review (December 1966).
2
survey of Current Busines~ (Oct~ber 1970) pp. 32, 33. In 1970
earnings in manufac turing declined to about 10 percer.t in the U.S.
a~ to·abou t 12 percent on UoS. foreign investm ents. Survey of Current
Business (October 1971) p. 31-

't
'

'
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we only observe actual short-run profits:, ( 2) by manipulating

11

transfer

prices 11 am.ong subsidiaries in various countries, international firms are
able to report their largest profits where the marginal tax rates are
1 2
lowest~ , to explain the observed data, this argument requires that the
marginal tax rate be lower in the U.S. than in the rest of the world; and
(3) international firms are able to avoid completely reporting some of

3
.
• f oreign
pro f'its.
t h eir

A second major empirical observation is that within the same industry
there is investment abroad by U.S. firms at the same time that foreign
firms are investing in the U.S.

As Aliber put it, "the test of a theory

of foreign investment is its ability to explain investment crossflows--why
foreign firms invest in the United States in those industries in which

1

Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay (New York:
pp. 154, 268, 276.

Basic Books, 1971),

2
The U.S. tax credit allowed for taxes to foreign government
only partially eliminates the incentive to show profits in countries
with lower tax rates than the U.S. Robert Hellawell, 11 United States
Income Taxation and Less Developed Countries: A Critical Appraisal,"
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 66 (December 1966) np. 1393-1422.
3

For a discussion of possible ways using differences in national
tax treatment of depreciation, see Walter A. Slowinski and Thomas M.
Haderlein, ' 1United States Taxation of Foreip;n Income: The Increasing
Role of the Foreign Tax Credit, 11 International Trade, Investment, and
Organization, ed. 1·Tayne R,. LaFave and Peter Hay (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1967). I owe -::his reference to Robert Hudec.
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U.S. firms im;est abroad. 11

l

Probably the major theoretic explanation for

this two-way investment flow assumes that firms are partial monopolists
maximizing profits.

'i'his theory, dev•~loped by Stephen Hymer,

2

says that,

in Kindlebergervs w0.: ds, "for c:J..rect tnvestment to thrive there must be
some imperfection in markets for goods or facto::.-s, ir..cluding among the
latter technoJ_ogy) or f;c;ie ints:::ference in ~ompetition by governments or
by firms, which scparat2. markets, !,

3

Aliber han recently offered another

explanation of forelgn :.'..ll"Jest.Iiler.t, which stresses the dj_fferences in
capitalization rc.tes of fi:.:111s :ln ii t:fo,:ent co·.mtries because the financial
markets in 7arious countT.ies appl? ditierent discount rates to the uncertainty about future ex,::h.<2,..ge :.:ates,

4

This theory has not, however,

been empiricall:1 test0d and hac difficulty in explaining new two-way
investm~nt,
Both the two-·way flow of investment and the lower rate of profit

in foreign investment could be explained by the theory of optimum
portfolio choice which c.t:rcsses that a low (or negative} correlation
between foreign and domest~c risks can make foreign investment attractive

l

Robert Zo A1iber, ''A Theory of Direct Foreign Investment," The
International Corporation, ed. Charles Po Kindlcberger (Cambridge, Hass.:
32.
H.I. T. Press~ 1970)

;·•p.

.

2

11
Stephen Hymer~· Tt1e International Operations of i,~ational Firms:
11
'.doc.:oral dissertat:ton, Cambridge, Hass.,
A Stur:!y of :...:.rect Iuvestment,

M.I.To, 1960).
3

Charles P. Kindleberger, E.P..... _<::it., p. 13 ..
Hymer's theory on pages 11.-33.
4

'Ai.ibe!:, op,

-~-i.~~-~

esp, pp,, 28-34,

Kind1.eberger presents

-
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even if its risk is highe1.· and its rate of return is lower.

1

While this

theory has recently been applied to long-term internatioual portfolio
investment

2

and to international trade,

3

it has ~ot been applied by

economists to •ai::ect corporate investment.

For example, although Vernon

says that international firms e~.counter ",., the pervasive presence of
ignorance .:::.nd un~ertaJ.nty in the deci:;;ion-·making process, 11
11

4

he feels

.,5
••• the portfolio investment analc.,gy was not very apt.'
Nor de those econcr:iists who st::ess .:he need for large firms to

reduce uncertainty <lea3. •vith overne&s :lnvestro.ent.

Galbraith, fo."F example,

ignores for~igr. investment as a pcssible v,ay for the "technostructure"
to reduce uncertainty 0ve:r. earnings and sales.

6

On the other hand,

1

Let x be the vari.able--such c1.s sales or p~~ofits--on which management
focuses. Let p be the proportion of x in country 1 and 1-p the proportion
in country 2. Let r be the •:!orrelat:i.on 1)ecween x in country 1 and x in
total ,rariance of x, vy the
Let vy_ +
country 2.
2 be t::le
variance of x in c0unt;.:·y 1, v~ be the yariarLce of x in country 2.
2
+ 2p(l-p)r 1 2 + (1-p/v;. Fo:r example, suppose the
vi+z = p

vi

vv

Then:

variance of salea is 9 in one country and 16 in another country and the
correlation between sales in the two countries is u25; then having
half of a firm rs sale;;.: in each cou:,try gives e. •ra:ciance for the firm's
worldwide sa:i..P.s -::if 7 3/4,
2

Herbert C-, Grubel, "Intc:1'.'national Diversified Portfolios: Welfare
Gains and Capitcl Flows,' Ameri-::!an Eccnomic Review, Vol. 58 (December 1968),
pp. 1299-1314. ::;o:cman C. llil~_er and Ha::ina V. N, t:hitman, "ANean-Variance
Analysis of Uniter3. States Long-Te:::rn Portfolio Foreign Investment," Quarte.rly
Journal of EconomL:s, Vol 84 (Hay J.970), pp. 175--196" Haim Levy and
Harshall Sarnat, ;'Internatior e.l Dive:i:-sif:~cntion of Investment Portfolios, 11
American Econc:mic Rev!c•l (Septemt.~r 1970) ,, pp. 66~-675.
\Jilliam C.., LrE..in&r,:i ancl Rich&rd N. Cooper, "Uncertainty and Diversi
fication in Int2ruation;;,.l 'l're.de, n StuJ.ies i-::i. Agricultural Economics, Trade
and Developmen~-~ Vol. 8 (1968) _,
4

5
6

Vernon~ _?._iZ.:.._cit., p. 11.3.
rbid., p., 153.

John Kenneth G;:::.lbraith, 'foe Hew Industrial State (New York:
Houghton Hifflin Co, s 1967), esp. chs. 3 and 20.,
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the president of a large U.S. firm with plants in 33 countries said,
"we know ••• that our worldwide operations cushion the impact on the
corporation as a whole of a recession in any one country.

This has,

, · 1i ty ••• 111
.
.
more staoi
our tota1 operations
i n e ff ect, given

Using a sample of 88 large firms during the period 1950-1964,
Fisher and Hall found that firms with larger fluctuations in their
profits

2

have larger average profit rates.

If one accepts the notion

that management looks at both fluctuations and at the rate of return

in choosing investments and that different managements have different
trade-offs between risk and return, then one could explain with one theory
(1) two-way foreign investment in the same industry, (2) lower observed
rates of return on foreign investment than on domestic investment, and
(3) differences among industries and among firms in an industry as to
the extent of foreign investment.

3

1

Testimony of James W. HcKee, Jr., Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, July 27-30,
1970, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 767.
2

Fluctuations are measured by the standard deviation of the deviations of
observed rate of return from the rate of return predicted by a fitted
trend. I. N. Fisher and G. R, Hall, "Risk and Corporate Rates of
Return, 11 Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 83 (February 1969),
pp. 79-92.

3
vernon, for example, finds that only 187 of the Fortune "500
firms" have at least six foreign manufacturing subsidiaries. These
187 firms fall into 23 SIC industries, In some industries almost
every firm is 11 international", and in other industries only a few
firms are. The proportion of industr~1 sales accounted for by Vernon's
187 "international" firms ranges from 85 percent to 4 percent.

-
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In the next part of this paper I present some empirical results
on the extent to which overseas operations reduced the amount of risk
faced by large

u.s,

corporations in the 1960's.

The results suggest

that in some industries overseas activities reduced the firm's risk.
While the statistical results are not overwhelming, I do not know of
any statistical studies, at the firm level, which test any of the
competing theories of direct foreign investment.

The third part of

the paper presents evidence that there is less than a perfect cor
relation among the gross national products in tl1e U.S. and the major
centers of U.S. foreign investment.

The final section is a brief

conclusion.

II

The major data problem is measuring the extent to which U.S.
firms have overseas ope:cations.

I use two alternative measures .•

Bruck and Lees examined the Fortune 500 largest industrial firms
for 1965; using mainly company reports, they examined each firm's
foreign operations in terms of sales, profits, assets, employment,
and production and then assigned a single ranking to each of 335 firms;
they were unable to collect enough data to rank the remaining 165
firms.

1

From the point of view of testing a diversification model,

1

Nicholas K. Bruck and Francis A. Lees, Foreign Investment,
Capital Controls, and the Balance of Payments, New York University
Institute of Finance Bulletin No. 48-49 (April 1968).

- 8 -

their data have the disadvantage of viewing the world as having only
two areas:

the U.S. and the rest of the world.

Thus one cannot test,

with their data, the presumption that it makes a difference whether
a firm with half its operations in the U.S. has operations in only one
I therefore also used

foreign country or in many foreign countries.

the number of fo1:eign countries in which in 196 7 there was a manufacturing
1
subsidary owned by one of the 1963 Fortune 500 or the 1964 Fortune 500 •
The two major conceptual problems are identifying the variable
that management wishes to maximize and measuring the risk attached to
Finding inconclusive the discussion on whether management
2
Following
maximizes sales or profits after taxes, I exam:!.ne both.
this variable.

Fisher and Hall, I use as one measure of r:!.sk the standard deviation
1

of the deviations around a fitted trend line,- which I call the standard
I also measure risk by the coefficient of variation:

error.

the

standard deviation of the observations divided by their average value.
I examine both the nine year per:l.od centered around 1965
(1961-1969) and the five year period centered around 1965 (1963-1967).

1

These unpublished data were kindly made available to me
by the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project.
2

Data on annual sales and annual profits after taxes are from
Moody's and Standard and Poor.
3
tet xt = sales or profits in year t and t = year t. Then the
trend is computed by least-squares estimation of log x =a+ t log (1 + b).
Those 33 companies having occassional negativetprofi ts during
the period are therefore omitted from the sample.

- 9 -

I follow the allocation by Bruck and Lees of each company to one
of the 42 industries based on the 3 digit SIC code.

I then limited my

study to those 26 industries which have at least five firms.

I use 25

dummy variables to identify these industries, which are listed in Table
I.

On the conjecture that a firm can increase its stability by producing

many products, I use the product diversification index of the Harvard
Multinational Enterprise Project.

This index is the number of 5 digit

SIC categories produced in 1966 by each company.

Finally, I use as an

independent variable the size of the company, measured as either the
average annual sales or the average annual profits, during the period.
In summary, I conjecture that the stability of a company's
profits or sales (1) is positively related to the extent of its foreign
activities, the number of products it produces, and its size, and
(2) depends on the industry to which it belongs.
my sample size to 233 firms.

Data limitations reduce

Tables 2 and 3 give the results of ordinary

least squar~s regressions for 1961-1969 and 1963-1967 for all variables
except the dummy variables.
Since I look at two time periods, two measures of risk, and both
sales and profits, there are 8 possible dependent variables.

For each

dependent variable there are two measures of foreign investment:

the

number of countries and the Bruck and Lees ranking of overseas activity.
The 16 regressions each explain about 20-30 percent of the variation in
the dependent variable.

Regressions (3) and (4) for 1961-1969 are

-10-

Table I

Industty

(1)
Meat products

SIC Number

(2)

Number of Firms in Sample

(3)

201
202

5
7

203

9

Grain mill products

204

6

Bakery products

205

5

Alcoholic beverages
(excluding soft drinks)

208

5

Textile mill products

221

12

Paper and. allied
products

262

14

Chemicals

281

20

Drugs

283

13

Soaps, detergents,
and cosmetics

284

6

Petroleum refining

291

21

Glass and glass
products

321

5

Concrete, gypsum, and
asbestos

326

5

Steel works and mills

331

15

Nonferrous metals

333

12

Metal products

349

5

Farm and construction
machinery

352

11

Metal working machinery

35lf

6

Office machines and
computers

357

5

Electrical equipment
and apparatus

361

9

Household appliances

362

5

Dairy products
Canning fruits
and vegetables

Miscellaneous fabricated

- 11 -

Table 1 continued:
Industry

SIC Number

(1)

(2)

Number of Firms in Sample
(3)

Communications equipment

366

8

Motor Vehicles and parts
Aircraft and parts

371

6

372

12

Optical instruments

383

6

Total above:

233

I,

- 12 -

Table 2
1961-1969

Profits

Humber
of countries
(1)

Overseas
Activity
(2)

Number
of Products
(3)

Size
(4)

-2
(5)
R

F

(6)

Coefficient
of Variation
(1)

.0002
(. 23)

-.0071
(-3.56)
-.0002

(2)

(-2.06)

-.0005
(-.74)

-.086
(-1.00)

• 32

3.37

-.165

.29

2.96

(-1.97)

Standard error
(3)

-.0003
(-1.64)

(4)

-.058
(-.29)

.19

1.67*

(-1. 74)

-.0025
(-1.57)

-.026
(-.14)

.20

1. 7$*

-.0008
(-.98)

.015
(1.85)

.22

2.02

-.0011
(-1.39)

(1. 48)

-.0005
(-1.18)

.013
(2.94)

.28 2. 77

-.0007
(-1.63)

.011
(2.56)

.27

-.0029

-.0007
(-.15)

Sales
Coefficient
of Variation
(5)

-.003
(-1.40)
.0000
(-. 37)

(6)

.012

.21 1.93

Standard error
(7)

-.0021
(-1. 80)

(8)

*Significan t at 2 percent.

.0000
(-. 95}

2.66
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Table 3

1963-1967

Profits

Number
Of countries
(1)

Overseas
Activity
(2)

Number
of products
(3)

Size
(4)

-2
R

F

(5)

(6)

Coefficient of
Variation

(1)

-.0046
(..;.2.69)
-.0001
(-1.68)

(2)

.0007
(1.16)

-.169
(-2. 39)

.31

3.34

.0003
(,.53)

-.217
(-3.17)

.30

3.12

-.0008
(-1.01)

-.049
(-. 56)

.28

2.86

-.0008
(-1.08)

-.053
(-. 63)

.28

2.86

-.0008
(-1.36)

.019
(3.26)

.28

2.85

-.001
(-1. 78)

.017
(3.00)

.28

2. 77

.020
(4.94)

• 29

3.01

(-1. 70)

-.0008
(-2.00)

.018
(4.87)

• 29

3.00

Standard error

(3)

-.0006
(-. 29)
.0000
(-. 44)

(4)
Sales
Coefficient of
Variation

(5)

-.0021
(-1.32)
.,.

.ooo

(6)

(-.40)
Standard error

(7)

-.0007

-.0015
(-l.l1l)

(8)

-.0001
(-1.31)

- l!-i- -

significant at the 2 percent level, and the other 14 regressions are
significant at the l percent level.
Either m~asure of forefgn investmeilt--the number of countries
[ column (1)] ur the B:.:uck and Lees ranking [ column (2) ]-·-has the
predicted negative coefficient in all cases~ but the coefficient for the
number of countrtP.:s has the greater t-ratio (shown in parentheses) in
6 of the 8 cases:

all except the standard of error of profits for

1961-1969 and for 1963-67"

In these six cases the significance level

fo t:he coefficient for the number of countries ranges between 16 percent
and 7 percent ex~ept foe the coefficient of variation for profits,
where the significance level i s l percent.
The coefficient for the 11urober of products--column (3)--has the
predicted negative value in 13 out of the 16 regressions.

The coefficient

for the size cf the firm·,.· column (4)--- has the predicted negative value
for the 8 regressions for profits but is unexpectedly positive for the
8 regressions for Eales.
When viewed :ln isolation , overseas activities may well be more
risky than domestic activities.

The :.:egressions are consistent

with the view that overseas investment increased the worldwide stability
of large U.S. firms in the 1960vs.

- 15 -

III

The analysis in the preceding section assumed that foreign invest
ment led to greater stability .

The regressio ns are equally consisten t

with the other stream of causality :
investmen t.

more stable firms have more foreign

A recent study suggests that U.S. firms with higher vari

ability in earnings pay out larger dividends in order that management not
1
be fired by dissident stockhold ers ; firms with more retained earnings
could undertake more foreign investmen t.

To make a judgment on these

two alternati ve interpret ations of the regressio n results, I examined
the correlatio n in the economies of various countries .
While I would have :1.iked data on sales and profits for the 26
industrie s in each country, I only examined GNP in current prices in
Australia , Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, and U.K.

These six countries

accounted for 70 percent of the book value of all foreign U.S. investmen ts
2
I converted GNP in·local currency and current
in manufactu ring in 1970.
prices to dollars, on t~e ass~mptio n that U.S. firms use dollars as the
unit of account.

Occasiona l large devaluati ons of foreign exchange

rates are more than offset by inflation and by groi,.ith in real GNP in
each of these countries , so that in the 1960's the dollar value of

½ienry G. Grabowski and Dennis C. Uueller, "Hanager ial and
Stockhold er Welfare i.·lodels of Firm Expenditu res," Review of Economics
and Statistic s (February 1972), p. 20.
2

Survey of Current Business (October 1971), p. 33.

- 16 -

foreign GNP increased in almost every year.

I therefore estimated the

trend value of the aggregate dollar GNP of these six countries and the
U.S. from 1961-1969; the trend in the annual rate of growth for. these seven
countries is 7.4 percent.

I then calculate the deviations from

this trend for each country for each y~ar.

For Frqnce

the actual rate of growth always exceeded 7. 4 percent; for the United
Kingdom the acutal rate was always less than 7.4 percent; for the
other five countries the actual rate was sometimes more than 7.4 percent
and sometimes less.
deviations.

I then calculated the correlations among these

The results are shown in Table 4.

For a company whose

main orientation is the U.S., deviations from the aggregate trend of
GNP are negatively correlated in Australia and the U.K. and less than
1.0 for the other four countries.

To the extent that industry sales or

profits are correlated with GNP, this evidence supports the view that
overseas investment leads to more stability about the trend.

- 17 -

Table 4
Correlations of Deviations from Average Aggregate GNP,
1961-1969

u.s.
u.s.

LO

Australia
Brazil
Canada
U.K.
Germany

Australia
-. 71

1.0

Brazil

Canada

U.K

Germany

.64

.64

-.55

.44

.28

-.95

-.88

.85

-.36

-.75

1.0

.87

-.82

.47

.71

-.84

.60

.84

-.33

-.73

1.0

• 30

1.0

1.0

France

Source:

France

1.0

GNP in current prices and in national currency anci exchange
rates from International Financial Statistics (International
Monetary Fund)o
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IV
The finding the large U.S. corporations with more extensive
overseas activities tended to have smaller fluctuations in the 1960's
does not allow one to conclude that U.S. firms invested overseas in
order to reduce their risks.

This conclusion would be no.-more

warranted than if one were to conclude that firms invest overseas
in order to increase profits simply because one found that profits
were larger for firms with more overseas activity.

Reducing risk

(or increasing profits) may be the unintended result of corporation
actions taken for other reasons.

1

A judgment on the motivation for foreign investment is important
because economists frequently deduce the impact of foreign investment
from an assumption concerning motivation,

As Caves put it, "in the

absence of externalities and market imperfections, the case for free
movement of direct investment as a. means of maximizing world welfare
is simply the case for allowing any factor or product to flow towards
locations where it has the greatest excess of :narginal value over

¾10s t economists tend to assume that large firms are motivated in
ways analogous to individuals, though economists are at a comparative
disadvantage in explaining individuals.' motivation. As the psychologist
David McClelland put it, Freud " ••• destroyed forever (except, perhaps,
in the minds of economic theorists) the notion that motives are rational
or can be rationally inferred from action." David C. llcClelland, The
Achieving Society (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p. 38.
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margin al cost."

1

Caves, of course , stress es that much intern ationa l

assumes
invest ment seems to depend on marke t imper fectio ns even if one
seems
firms are maxim izing profit s. The recent Presid ential Commission
to ignore this qualif icatio n in saying

11

•••

the intern ationa l invest ment

areas
proces s may be viewed as the movement of produ ctive resour ces from
ing
of lesser to areas of greate r relati ve oppor tuniti es, thereb y improv
t, host,
the world 's alloca tion of resour ces to the mutua l benef it of paren
112
and other count ries.
If furthe r resear ch should suppo rt the view that a major .reaso n
firm's
for invest ment in foreig n countr ies is in order to reduce the
it
risks, then one might be even more skept ical of the mutua l benef
of a free intern ationa l movement of corpo rate capita l.

While each firm

the
may feel it is reduci ng its own risk throug h foreig n invest ment,
ility of
action s of all the intern ationa l firms may increa se the instab
some nation al econom ies and reduce the instab ility of others .
Finall y, a judgem ent on firms' motiv ation is impor tant for those
ntri_es _,_
---~ou nt-ri-e s wh±-ch --seek- to-att-r act- --£-ere'ig-n- i-nvest ment. -Rorei gn_cou
ed
espec ially develo ping count ries, adver tise incent ive schemes design
ity
to increa se the foreig n firm's profit s and also empha size the stabil
of the countr y.

Hy analys is sugge sts a countr y could attrac t foreig n

its
invest ment by empha sizing the low (or negati ve) correl ation of
fluctu ations with those of other count ries,

Rather than claimi ng for

claim
examp le, that worke rs never strike , a foreig n govern ment could
on strike .
are
they never strike in years when worke rs in other count ries
1

Richar d E. Caves, "Inter nation al Corpo ration s: The Indus trial
11
22.
Economics of Foreig n Invest ment, Economica (Febru ary 19 71), p.
2
united States Intern ationa l Economic Policy in an Interd epend ent
World (Wash ington , D.C., July 1971), p. 173.

